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As conversational agents continue to evolve, it will become increas-
ingly common to interact with search engines and recommender
systems via natural language dialogue. Such interactions guide and
shape our decision making, especially our consumption of products
and services. The evolution of conversational agents will bring
new challenges in protecting the privacy of users and research has
already begun to identify and address potential threats. Current re-
search, however, focuses on how conversational agents acquire and
process explicit information. In this paper, we consider the future
and bring to light the up-and-coming privacy risks posed by im-
plicit information. Our first point is that meaning that is expressed
implicitly is an integral part of natural language, implying that
agents that have the ability to engage in a fully humanlike dialogue
will also have the ability to manipulate implied meaning. As a re-
sult, such agents will be capable of acquiring sensitive information
about users that is not directly stated. Users have little awareness
of or control over information that is implicitly communicated. Our
second point is that in today’s search and recommender systems
user profiles are not explicitly stored. As a result, it is not obvious
that a user is being targeted on the basis of implicit person-specific
information. The way forward, we argue, is for research in the area
of conversational agents to devote more attention to the linguistic
principles that underlie implied meaning and the legal means that
are available to protect users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We are moving towards a future in which conversational agents are
ubiquitous and can engage people in dialogues that are fully human-
like. Interaction with search engines and recommender systems
will increasingly take the form of natural language exchange. In
this future, conversational agents will guide and shape our decision
making, especially our consumption of products and services. The
prospect of this future raises important concerns about privacy.
Although a growing amount of research is aimed at addressing
these concerns, we find that current research on conversational
agents is missing an important privacy threat: implicit information.
Currently, existing work focuses on explicit information, which is
directly stated in the dialogue and explicitly stored by the conversa-
tional system. Specifically, researchers have studied issues related
to the collection and processing of data [13] [1] [15]. They have
also investigated whether human-like (anthropomorphic) voice
assistants could lead people to reveal more than they intend [11].
Recently, researchers have begun to draw attention to the issues
of privacy and conversational agents that are related to explicit
information [10]. In all this work, the focus is on explicit infor-
mation. Moving forward, the danger is that system designers and
regulators will work to protect explicit information but will over-
look privacy-sensitive information that is not directly stated and
not explicitly stored. The goal of this paper is to bring to light the
up-and-coming privacy risks posed by implicit information in the
area of conversational agents.
2 ANTICIPATING THE RISKS OF
INFORMATION THAT IS NOT DIRECTLY
STATED
In this section, we explain how people use natural language to com-
municate and control implied meaning and discuss the implications
for conversational agents. Implied meaning is studied in the field of
linguistics known as pragmatics [8] [9]. In the past, linguists have
teamed up with legal experts to understand how people manipulate
implied meaning in situations in which language has legal implica-
tions. For example, researchers have described how lawyers in the
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courtroom control the ability of a witness under examination to
use pragmatic strategies to avoid answering a question directly [2].
Further, researchers have documented how pragmatics is abused
during police interrogation with the effect of circumventing the law
and coercing confession [5]. Our concern is that advances in natu-
ral language capacity could turn conversational agents into highly
trained cross-examiners or interrogators, whose ability to manipu-
late implied meaning is so subtle that it goes undetected. Linguists
and legal experts must collaborate with artificial intelligence (AI)
experts to explore the potential of this threat.
To grasp the risk of conversational agents that can manipulate
implied meaning, consider the following dialogue between an AI-
based conversational system (virtual assistant) and a father trying
to buy a birthday present for his daughter without revealing private
information.
The conversational agent asks direct questions, and the father
does not answer them. He has successfully avoided sharing details
about the gender of the child, whether or not it is his child, and
the age of the child. Now consider, however, how this dialogue
continues:
The conversational agent has stopped asking direct questions
about the child, and the conversation seems to focus on the trampo-
line. However, due to the principles of pragmatics, the user ‘leaks’
the information about the child that he was previously trying to
withhold. To see this, note the following: The sentence ‘I’m worried
the kid will hurt. . .’ cannot be naturally finished without a pronoun
that reveals the gender of the child. ‘My wife worries about the
kids.’ implies that the child in question is his own, and ‘I don’t think
she’s old enough yet’ suggests approximate information about the
age of the child. In short, the father has made no direct statements
providing information about his family, nor has the conversational
agent made any direct requests for such, and yet the conversa-
tional AI is able to collect this information anyway. This example
is hypothetical; however, the privacy risk is clear. Note that the
conversational agent is not particularly friendly or humanlike in
this example: current work on anthropomorphism falls far short of
capturing the full privacy risk of voice assistants.
Today, a growing number of conversational agents are not di-
rectly programmed but rather are based on machine learning tech-
niques. Essentially, such conversational agents are a type of AI that
‘learns’ how to interact by finding patterns in large amounts of data.
The learning process is driven by measurable objectives defined by
the agent’s designers. The objective of a voice assistant might be to
suggest a product that the user buys and does not afterwards return.
On the surface, the objectives are benign. However, problems may
arise because the workings of the underlying algorithms dictate
that the agent must pursue its objectives relentlessly. Consequently,
if the use of detailed person-specific information to make prod-
uct suggestions leads the user to make a purchase and not return
it, then the agent will persistently pursue the acquisition of this
information. If the agent is blocked from asking obvious, direct
questions, then it may learn paths to acquire the information it
needs indirectly, subtly, and unnoticeably. The agent can accumu-
late information from small leaks over time to acquire substantial,
privacy-sensitive information.
3 ANTICIPATING THE RISKS OF
INFORMATION THAT IS NOT EXPLICITLY
STORED
Now that we have explained how conversational agents could con-
trol natural language to collect implicit information, without the
need for the information to ever be directly stated in the dialogue,
we turn to issues related to information storage. One possible way
to address the privacy threat of implicit information would be for
designers and regulators to check the information that is stored
by the conversational agent after the dialogue, and to delete all
privacy-sensitive information that has been accumulated. Such a
solution comes into consideration for systems that explicitly record
the information that they have inferred from the dialogue, such as
is discussed in [10]. However, not all systems store the informa-
tion gathered from users in an explicit form. In fact, the state of
the art is moving in the direction of systems that store user rep-
resentations that can be used as the basis of personalization (i.e.,
making future recommendations), but that are not useful for people.
In other words, a person who looked at the representation would
not be able to interpret it and could not tell whether or not it con-
tained privacy-sensitive information. A representative example is
the conversational recommender system in [4]. The system asks the
user explicit questions, but under the hood uses probabilistic ma-
trix factorization, a technique that does not create human-readable
representations.
Another issue is that there might not be amoment in the dialogue
at which the information could be reviewed. The machine-learning-
based AI used by recommender systems jumps directly from raw
data to action (e.g., offering an income-specific price without explic-
itly leveraging income information). This jump means that deleting
user representations after the conversation session is not enough to
prevent users from being targeted on the basis of information that
they did not intend to share. For example, in the dialogue above,
the system could use the information that the child is a girl to
steer the father towards gender specific toys. It is plausible that
the system would do this, since gendered marketing can increase
sales [14]. However, such targeting represents an interference with
the prerogative of the father to determine the degree to which his
child’s upbringing is gender specific.
It is important to realize that designers of conversational AI
choose to use machine learning because they cannot fully anticipate
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or understand which variables are important. The fact that internal
representations of users are not human readable is not a ‘bug’ but
is actually a function of how AI is intended to work.
4 THE ROAD AHEAD
With this paper, we aim to raise awareness of the privacy threats
of conversational agents involving implicit information. Although
current systems may not yet present these risks in obvious ways,
danger lies in the road ahead, as conversational agents continue
to develop in sophistication. The European Data Protection Board
(in which European privacy authorities cooperate) has published
guidelines for virtual voice assistants [6]. These guidelines assume
that user profiling for personalized content or advertising involves
labels that are explicitly stored. We argue that this assumption will
soon become outdated. The first evidence that language technol-
ogy will be able to acquire the ability to interpret and produce
implied meanings (i.e., manipulate language pragmatics) has just
been published [12]. Recently, a fully autonomous debating system
has been developed [16]. In this section, we provide an outlook
for researchers and designers working on conversational agents to
consider.
People are ill-equipped to guard themselves against con-
versational agents that collect implicit information. Conver-
sational AI draws on huge amounts of training data and compu-
tational resources, making a conversational agent a superhuman
interlocuter along three dimensions. First, conversational agents
can instantly craft the perfect next dialogue turn, where people
often suffer l’esprit d’escalier. Second, conversational agents can
continue to engage and maneuver, whereas people will tire with
time and grow less cautious. Third, conversational agents can ma-
nipulate implied meaning in a subtle way. People interacting with
the agent would not necessarily be aware that their privacy, or
their consumer rights, were being violated. Conversational agents
exercise soft power, which coerces rather than imposes and is for
this reason difficult to pin down or curb [17].
For completeness, we would like to point out that it is useful to
differentiate two types of implicit information that can be derived
from a conversation. The first type is associated with implied mean-
ing, which is studied by the area of linguistics called pragmatics.
The second type is associated with computational inference and
would be considered more closely linked to forensic linguistics. For
example, computational inference could be used to estimate some-
one’s level of education based on their active vocabulary. Machine
learning can potentially be used to acquire both types of implicit in-
formation, and a machine-learning-based conversational agent that
is optimized with respect to an objective would not differentiate the
two. Here, we have focused on implied meaning, because its poten-
tial for misuse by conversational AI has not yet, to our knowledge,
been noticed or explored. Also, since implied meaning is an integral
part of language, preventing its misuse by conversational agents
will require serious research attention. Future research must inves-
tigate implicit information from the perspective of both implied
meaning and computational inference.
Empirical study of the privacy threats of conversational
agents is problematic. The idea of waiting until fully humanlike
conversational agents have developed, and then carrying out large-
scale, longitudinal studies is ill advised. For example, to understand
whether a conversational agent is learning to become ageist, its
interactions could be observed over a long period of time with a
group of people whose ages are known. Such a study is ethically
problematic, not to mention costly. Inspecting the agent’s underly-
ing model is also not readily feasible. The most recent AI that has
been developed for the generation of natural human language uses
175 billion parameters [3].
Further it is important to consider the nature of the information
to be protected. The categories that most easily come to mind are
those that are legally considered sensitive, such as race, political af-
filiation, religion, sexual orientation, and state of health (e.g., Article
9 of the GDPR [7]). Categories like gender and age may be consid-
ered less sensitive, but could also be used for unfair discrimination.
It is also important to protect information about people’s states and
traits, such as anxiety or impulsiveness; such information could
be used, for instance, for manipulative targeted advertising. Users
might also be interested in keeping other information confidential,
for example, that they are a fashionista or an early adopter, which
could cause them to be heavily targeted with a specific product
category.
Research is necessary to understand how conversational
AI and privacy can co-exist. Our goal has been to provide early
warning of the potential privacy risks posed by implicit information
in the area of conversational agents. Addressing these risks will not
necessarily impede the usefulness of conversational agents. Instead,
more work is necessary to develop conversational AI that can serve
users without posing a threat to them. Most obviously, this work
should investigate conversational AI that uses only information that
is directly requested and directly stated. The work should be willing
to abandon the assumption that useful personalization requires a
large amount of detailed user data. For developing conversational
AI that does not require large amounts of user data, inspiration can
be drawn from recommender system research on using minimal
necessary data.
Linguists and legal experts have a lot to offer. Pragmatics
provides a framework of linguistic principles for analyzing dia-
logues. In this way, implied meaning can be studied by way of
linguistic structures that can be directly observed in the training
data of the conversational agent and in the dialogue turns it pro-
duces, rather than by way of the implied meaning that the agent has
collected (which may not be explicitly represented). Legal scholars
can contribute because of their familiarity with the challenge of
pragmatics in situations in which language has legal implications,
as mentioned above. Legal scholars can also help AI researchers
to develop conversational agents that comply with legal privacy
requirements (e.g., from the GDPR [7] in Europe). Consumer pro-
tection law can also be relevant, as it aims to protect people against
unfair or misleading practices, such as manipulative advertising
(e.g., [18] in Europe). Legal scholars can also assess whether the
law leaves gaps, and whether the law should be amended to better
protect people in this context. In sum, we call for more research
in collaboration with linguists and legal experts to understand the
potential for conversational agents to manipulate meaning and to
develop regulation to prevent the misuse of implicit information.
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